To
Professor E. Hall
with kind regards

Cover

LECTURE

ON

THE SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

DELIVERED TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BETHUNE SOCIETY, ON THE 13TH APRIL, 1854.

BY

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LECTURE ON THE SÁNKHYA PHILOSOPHY.

GENTLEMEN,

It may appear presumptuous in me to lecture on the Sánkhya philosophy before an assembly chiefly consisting of Hindus, who must be supposed to be more intimately acquainted with the philosophical systems that have sprung up from their own soil than any body else. And certainly, if the matter of the lecture concerned the present condition of the Hindus, their manners, customs, &c. the presumption could hardly be denied; but the case is different with regard to their philosophy and in general to their sciences. Since the first European scholar studied Sanscrit, the barriers which separated the mental treasures of the Hindus from other nations, have been broken; the science which formed for a long time the exclusive heirloom of one cast, has become the property of the human mind. The study of most of those systems has ceased among the Hindus themselves, and they have become matter of history, as they are deposited in works which are accessible to every enquirer.

Moreover, the knowledge of the philosohpy of the Greeks and of modern Europe throws a new light upon the systems of the Hindus;—I do not here allude to historical enquiries, not to the question, whether Greek philosophy was derived from the Hindus, or vice versâ, Hindu philosophy from the Greeks, whether there existed at any time a connexion between them, and of what kind it was;—this question, however interesting it may be, is yet a minor one, but I refer here to the connexion of the ideas, the leading thoughts in one and the same system, their origin, their development and their consequences as well as to the connexion of one system with others. As the study of the Sanscrit by Europeans laid a new foundation for the comparative study of languages, as from that period we understand more

exactly the organism of the Persian, Greek and Latin tongues, of the Celtic, Teutonic and Sclavonic languages, and their affinities to each other, as all ethnological enquiries have gained thereby an unexpected aid, so does the study of Hindu philosophy expand the basis of philosophy in general and establish it more firmly than before, while, on the other hand, Hindu philosophy receives the same assistance from the study of those systems which arose in other times and countries.

Under these circumstances I may venture, I think, to lay before you a sketch of one of the systems of Hindu philosophy, especially as I may plead in my favour a study of many years and an interest in them which commenced long before I came to this country.

But here an objection of another kind forces itself on our consideration. Why should we lose time in the study and explanation of systems which are antiquated and exploded, as some say, why shall we not turn our attention rather to more useful objects? Since the time that Hindu philosophy flourished, a new science has sprung up: natural philosophy. Here we find a science, based on exact observation, which explains the phenomena of nature in their true connexion. The explanations, on the other hand, which any system of the Hindus offers on the nature of matter, are, to say the least, such as would result only from scientific enquiry in its infancy, and have long been superseded by the splendid discoveries in natural science generally and in chemistry specially.

This argument appears indeed formidable; for we cannot help admitting, that the ideas which the Hindu Philosophers held regarding the elements of matter, of ethereal, airy, fiery, watery and earthly elements, are altogether unfounded. As our first answer to this objection, let us direct our eyes to the philosophy of the Greeks, in order to ascertain, whether an analogous case is here presented to us or not. It is indeed so. The Greeks know only four elementary material substances, and their explanations of most of the phenomena of nature are as fanciful and unfounded as those of the Hindus; they had neither a more extensive sphere of observation nor better principles to explain

the same, and yet the philosophy of the Greeks is not, on this ground, considered useless. On the contrary, it has been studied from its commencement throughout all centuries, and its study is now more extensive and exact than in any preceding age.

However, there is yet another reason, on the strength of which we deem the above objection groundless. Philosophy has nothing to do with observing the phenomena of nature; this is the province of natural science. The enquiry of philosophy is beyond facts and experiments, and is directed to ideas or notions, their origin, their development and their connexion; it is directed to the notions which we have about the phenomena of nature, be they phenomena of external nature or matter, or phenomena of internal nature or mind. The general notions which we have about them are the true principles of philosophy, for instance the notions of matter, of substance and its modes of change, of the soul, its relation to matter, of the relation of matter and soul to God, &c. These notions have heen always the basis of philosophical enquiry, which has to commence from the same principles now, as it did some thousand years ago. Our only advantage is this, that we are in the possession of the thoughts of so many centuries before us, that we have not to overcome the many errors unavoidable by preceding thinkers, and finally that we are better able than at any previous time to define the spheres of the different sciences, whereas formerly the investigations of different sciences were confounded together, and one and the same individual pursued the study of many sciences which are now assigned to different enquirers.

In the exposition of any of the Hindu systems, we meet with a difficulty which the philosophical systems of other nations do not present to us. We cannot trace, it seems, the history of the Hindu systems, we cannot trace, which system was the first, in what manner it developed itself, how it gave rise to doctrines differing from it, and what was the influence of the various systems upon each other. This is certainly a great disadvantage; for to know their history does not merely gratify an idle curiosity, but we get thereby a deeper insight into the leading thoughts of the systems themselves, and we soon observe, that

there is not merely a succession of one system after another in time, but also a succession of them as regards their ideas, so that any given system could not have made its appearance, had not certain others preceded it. In respect to this we are much more fortunately placed with regard to the philosophical tenets of the Greeks. Here the philosophical schools are separated in time and in thought. We can trace the progress from Thales to Anaximander, &c.; we see, how the schools of Pythagoras, of Elea, &c. treat the same subject, and how all these schools were necessary to render possible the origin of such a system as that of Plato, which collected the thoughts of all his predecessors into one focus, so that, though altogether different from the previous systems, it is yet supported by all of them.

How different the case of the Hindu systems! Like Minerva from the head of Jupiter, they seem to spring into life at once full grown and in all their perfection. They pretend to be derived from Rishis or divine sages, and we are not only unable to comprehend, how one system proceeded from the other, but, on the first glance at least, we do not observe any development within one and the same system, or the influence which other systems exercised on its progress; for its development as well as its polemical relations at various times to other systems are received as integral parts in the work which is ascribed to the founder of a school. The only historical connexion which all the systems confess, is with the Upanishads, upon which they profess to be founded, and any critical and historical enquiry that may in future be made concerning them, must therefore take the Upanishads as the basis of its investigation.

However serious the above mentioned defect, viz. the want of an historical foundation, may be, and however little chance there is, that it should be fully remedied by future discoveries, the Hindu systems have one advantage which, in some measure, may counterbalance the defect. Generally speaking, the systems are remarkably well defined; their views do not fluctuate between extreme points; they are strengthened by the thoughts of whole centuries, and in them the consequence of each idea as well as the principle involved is distinctly recognised.

We may consider it as another advantage, that the orthodox systems of the Hindus, viz. those which profess to be founded on the Vedas, are but few in number, viz. six, the Púrva Mímánsá and the Uttara Mímánsá, the Sánkhya and the Yoga, and the Vaiseshika and Nyáya; and in fact, if we analyse them more closely, we shall find that three only remain, the Uttara Mímánsá or Vedánta, the Sánkhya, and the Vaiseshika, the other three being subdivisions which arose in one and the same school.

These systems are deposited in six sets of Sútras which, as I observed before, are ascribed to divine authorship. The Sútras are short sentences, each of which generally contains the result of a long process of thought, and which have been shaped into their present form by the successive efforts of a number of acute thinkers. Their meaning is at first difficult to understand, as the intermediate links connecting one Sútra with another, are frequently omitted, but after close and attentive study, we may discern from the Sútras themselves, without the aid of a commentary, the ideas which form the connecting links.

After these preliminary remarks I proceed to my subject, the Sánkhya philosophy. I have selected this as the subject of my discourse, in preference to the other systems, for two reasons. First, because it is among the Hindus themselves less known than the other systems. The Vedánta and Nyáya are studied everywhere in India, the first on account of its metaphysical and theological doctrines which are those of the majority of the educated Hindoos, and the latter for its logic which is there more completely treated than in any other system. Secondly the Sánkhya has in some points attained to a greater perfection than any other of the Hindu systems, especially in its idea of philosophy and its definition of the method to be followed in philosophical enquiries. To these points I shall subsequently revert.

Two sets of Sútras are ascribed to Kapila, the founder of the Sánkhya school, viz. the Sánkhya-Tattva-Samása, and the Sánkhya-Pravachana-Sútras. The former is probably a later composition; for it does not contain Sútras, but is merely a table of contents. The Sánkhya-Pravachana-Sútras are the most ancient

work of the Sánkhya which we possess; that it is, however, not the first production of the school, is clear from the reference made in it to a work of Panchasikha, the disciple of Ásuri, whose teacher was Kapila, the reputed founder of the Sánkhya. The composition of the Sánkhya-Pravachana-Sútras is of a comparatively recent date; not only are the other orthodox systems of the Hindus mentioned therein, but also four philosophical sects of the Bauddhas, which would bring it down to about the first century after Christ. The arrangement of the subjects is confused, and there is much repetition, but it is at the same time the armoury, in which successive thinkers have deposited their polemical weapons. Two editions have been published of this work, the one lately by the Asiatic Society, and Dr. Ballantyne has commenced translating it into English.

I would now draw your attention to a work of the Sánkhya which is one of the most perfect specimens of systematic composition in the Sanscrit literature, the Sánkhya Kariká by Ísvara Krishṇa. This work is throughout founded upon the Sánkhya-Pravachana-Sútras; it gives the substance of the latter and the whole process of its argument, but with greater force, as it is more systematically arranged and avoids controversy with other systems, so that the attention is never withdrawn from the argument. In the narrow compass of 72 Slokas it gives a well defined and complete sketch of the system. How highly it has been estimated, you may perceive from the fact, that it has been even commented upon by Vedántists, nay more, and this I would especially urge upon your notice, it has had the rare good fortune to be translated into four European languages, the Latin, the English, the French and the German, and has been explained and written on by such distinguished European scholars and philosophers as Colebrooke, Lassen, Wilson, Ritter, Hegel, Windischmann, Cousin and St. Hilaire. Many of you, I am sure, are familiar with Colebrooke's admirable treatise on the Sánkhya which has opened the road to all subsequent enquiries. Of the other authors I will here only briefly advert to Victor Cousin and St. Hilaire.

Victor Cousin has given a sketch of the Hindu philosophy in the

first volume of his course of the History of Philosophy. Many of his remarks are pertinent and profound; but his enquiry is frequently impaired by his mode of classifying philosophical systems. He divides them into four classes, Sensualism, Idealism, Scepticism and Mysticism. Sensualism, according to him, is the philosophy of sensation; the authority of the senses is the only one acknowledged; matter therefore alone has existence, and not mind as being a result of matter. Idealism is founded on other phenomena of the mind, viz. on those of liberty, of the personality of man and of the identity of self. Reflection rises from the world of sensation, and entering into the world of thought, it separates itself more and more from material phenomena. Starting alone from the notions, inherent to thought, it becomes Idealism, and at its culminating point it denies the existence of matter altogether.

Materialism and Idealism, he proceeds to say, are always opposed to each other, and in constant war; whichever is last considered, appears to be the right system. On observing this result, the mind withdraws its assent from both, assumes an independent position, and by means of common sense, examines the foundation of both idealism and materialism. Finding only hypotheses on either part, it throws itself into the opposite extreme of dogmatism, and becomes scepticism.

The fourth system is Mysticism. This, according to Cousin, is based upon the spontaneous action of reason, of reason in its original nature, not considered as reasoning, but as reason comprehending itself. The spontaneous action of reason in its greatest energy is inspiration, and in this form it speaks with absolute authority. The character of inspiration, accordingly, is that of being primitive, antecedent to every process of reflection, accompanied with a lively faith, whence its authority results, and possessed of a sanctifying influence. Inspiration does not proceed from reasoning, which rather destroys it; during its sway, all the other faculties are suspended.

These four classes Cousin seeks also in the philosophy of the Hindus; and where does he discover them? He finds Idealism in the Nyáya and especially in the Vedánta, and Mysticism in the

Yoga of Patanjali. He is in some doubt, where to discover Scepticism, and Sensualism is in his opinion represented by what? By the Sánkhya. That is to say, he did not know where, but he had to find inhabitants for the territories into which he had divided philosophy. The only reason which he assigns is, that "Buddhi," intellect, is a production of matter; but this "intellect," being originally without conscience, becomes conscious only by its proximity to the soul, and Cousin might have discovered the refutation of his supposition by a more careful examination of the method, followed by the Sánkhya, which, as he acknowledges himself, furnishes excellent observations. However, Cousin wrote in 1829, when the Sánkhya had only just commenced to become more thoroughly known to European philosophers, and he has the merit of having been one of the first Europeans who estimated Hindu philosophy at its just worth.

St. Hilaire's work on the Sánkhya contains much research. It gives a patient and thorough analysis of the Sánkhya-Káriká, and from the results of this analysis it takes a comprehensive view of the whole of the Sánkhya philosophy. It is to be regretted, that he did not advert more frequently to the Sánkhya-Sútras; however, at the time of the publication of the work the Sútras were a closed book to all but Sanscrit scholars, as the translation by Dr. Ballantyne had not then appeared. To those who are familiar with French, I would particularly recommend St. Hilaire's work.

In the limited space of time, assigned to this lecture, I can only give you a sketch of the Sánkhya, containing its leading thoughts, and a standing point from which you can survey the system and form an estimate, as to the extent to which it has realised the idea of philosophy. To do this in any way satisfactorily, I must reverse the order adopted by the Sánkhya, and follow my own way of explanation.

The term Sánkhya has two meanings: enumeration and investigation. According to the first sense, it would be a system, distinguished from others, by enumerating its principles; this, however, is no mark of excellence in a philosophical system, and would hardly distinguish it from any other science, in which also

the principal notions are usually enumerated. The latter meaning of the term "Sánkhya" is investigation, enquiry by discrimination; and this latter meaning offers an important distinction, and includes at the same time the notion of enumeration. It is, accordingly, a system which distinguishes ideas according to their essential characteristics, defines those ideas, assigns to each its respective sphere, and determines their number and the order in which each is to be treated. In all the enquiries which form the scope of this system, such conclusions only are recognised as true as are the immediate result of the principles which the system lays down. These principles, therefore, are not derived from any other science, or from revelation; but from the power of discrimination, by which alone, according to the Sánkhya, a system of philosophy can be constructed.

In order to enable you better to comprehend the doctrines which I am going to explain, I shall first enumerate these principles, which are the basis of the Sánkhya philosophy.

There are 25 principles, which are distinguished according to their relation to causality. Every thing that exists is either produced or not produced; if produced, it is again either producing or not producing; if not produced, so also it is either producing or not producing. According to this view, all things are divided into four classes. 1. That which is producing, but not produced. 2. What is produced and producing. 3. What is produced and not producing. 4. What is not produced and not producing.

The first of these classes,—that which produces, though itself unproduced,—contains but one principle, which is the general origin of all created things, viz. Múla Prakriti, or Original Nature. The second class of produced and producing principles are seven in number, viz. intellect (buddhi), self-consciousness, or, as metaphysicians term it, Egoity (ahankára), and the five subtile elements of matter, ether, air, fire, water and earth. The third class of produced and non producing principles are sixteen, viz. the five gross elements, the five intellectual senses,—the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose,—the five organs of action, viz. the hand, the foot, &c. and lastly the mind (manas) which is an

external and at the same time an internal organ. Intellect is produced by Original Nature, and produces Egoity. Egoity is an effect of intellect, and produces at the same time the five subtile elements and the eleven organs. The five subtile elements are produced by Egoity, and again produce the five gross elements. The five gross elements and the eleven organs are produced, but do not again produce. The fourth class contains the twenty-fifth and last principle, viz. the soul, which is neither produced nor producing.

How then does the Sánkhya arrive at these principles? what are the proofs to convince us that there are only these principles, and no more, and what is the method which it follows in ascertaining and defining them?

You are all aware, I suppose, how important is the method which is used in any enquiry for the purpose of arriving at conclusions. Without method there is no certain progress in any research, and as method is required in every other science, it is indispensable in philosophy, as all the steps which are made in advance, must be founded on incontestable reasoning. You will find, accordingly, that, wherever philosophy has made some advance beyond the first rude and unconscious attempts at reflection, there has been also an enquiry into the means, by which the truth of its conclusions is established. Philosophy has no right to assert facts beyond the reach of common experience without offering proof. Thus the first attempt to define the method of philosophical enquiry amongst the Greeks, was made by the Eleatic School, whose doctrines most widely differed from the results of common experience. This is also the case with the Hindu systems. All of them comprehend an enquiry as to the sources of the evidence by which truth is established.

According to the Sánkhya, there are three kinds of evidence, Perception, Inference, and Testimony or verbal evidence. Perception requires the presence of the object of which there is a perception; it is produced by the connexion of the object with the senses. Perception is the basis of all other evidence; to be valid, inference as well as testimony must proceed from things that are perceived. Inference depends upon the knowledge of the con-

stant connexion of the predicate with the subject in a general proposition. Testimony lastly is knowledge based on the declaration of a trustworthy person. Inference is of three kinds, prior, posterior and general, the last kind being also called inference by analogy. That is prior inference, when from a visible object and by means of a previous knowledge the existence of something else is inferred; for instance, from smoke which is seen on a hill, fire is inferred. The previous knowledge in this case is, that where smoke is, there is also fire. That is posterior inference, when from the non-existence of the antecedent, the non-existence of the consequent is concluded, as when it is argued, that there is no smoke in a tank, because there is no fire. General or analogous inference is, where a certain effect is presumed in consequence of a similar effect having been experienced under similar circumstances; for instance, it is known by experience that the operation of cutting takes place by means of an instrument; analogically it is argued that, seeing for instance must be performed by an instrument, the eye, although the sense of sight, say the Hindu philosophers, is not a matter of perception. This last kind of inference is, in the opinion of the Sánkhya, the most important, as it leads to the knowledge of principles which are not perceived by the senses.

In the employment of these various kinds of syllogism, however, the Sánkhya is not distinguished from other Hindu systems, nor from other sciences; for argument is used in every scientific research. Moreover, arguing consists in connecting two notions by means of a third notion, which is called a middle term, and we argue accordingly, if we have a number of middle terms. But where shall we find them? They will probably not come spontaneously, and must therefore be discovered by a method different from that of argument. This is analysis; the basis of all philosophical research is analysis of the notions which form its object. By such an analysis no new notion is found; it produces merely the contents of the notions analysed in a distinct form. Philosophy, however, from its very commencement, quits the circle of what is ascertained by experience and by the analysis of that experience. Such notions, as are not the result of

analysis, are called synthetical notions. By what title philosophy is justified in the adoption of ideas which analysis does not find in the original notions which form its basis, is a question of great importance. Our time is too limited to discuss this, but I will at least assign the reason. The necessity of proceeding from notions within the range of our common experience to notions not therein contained, arises from the fact, that those notions are contradictory. This fact, that those notions are contradictory, and also, that they are not fictions of our own, but found on experience by analysis, is the origin of all philosophical enquiry. This fact, however, is not understood at the commencement of philosophical enquiry, but only at a later period of its development, as is frequently the case with mental operations; thus people speak correctly, without knowing the rules of grammar, or argue well, without being able to explain the rules obtaining in argument.

The Sánkhya, of all other Hindu systems, was best aware of the true method, and has best described it. You proceed, they say, in your thought from the material things composed of gross elements, to subtile elements; from these to Egoity or self-consciousness; from Egoity to Intellect, and from Intellect to Nature. How? All those principles, with the exception of nature, are productions, effects, and every effect requires a cause. You therefore ascend from effect to cause, to the cause of this cause, and so on, until you come to that which cannot be effect.—And how do we know that any thing is an effect? Observe, this is the principal question; for on this point the validity of the series of effects and causes must ultimately depend. A thing which is an effect, according to the Sánkhya, is finite in time, mutable, limited in extent, composed, and may be resolved again into its origin. These are the grounds on which the Sánkhya proceeds to search for a principle which is without cause, eternal and unlimited.

Accordingly, from the gross elements of matter the Sánkhya infers the existence of subtile elements; for every thing that is gross is formed of something less gross. The subtile elements are less compound in their nature and less limited in extent than the gross elements; still they are limited; one limits the other

by having qualities which the other has not; and independently of this, they are in relation to the senses, as the senses are in relation to their respective objects. The senses then as well as the subtile elements are dependent upon a higher principle, Egoity, which we may describe as the power of individualising. This principle must of course have objects, on which to perform its process, and these objects are presented by Intellect, or the power of discrimination. This power again, as discriminating, is limited, and there must be something prior to intellect and unlimited. This is Nature, than which, according to the Sánkhya, there is no higher cause. Further, in all the effects of nature the three qualities of Goodness, Passion or Activity, and Darkness or Dulness are observable. Goodness consists in pleasure, it enlightens and alleviates; when goodness prevails, the frame is light, the intellect is luminous, and the senses are acute. Passion consists in pain; it is active, versatile and stimulating. Darkness is restraint, and conceals. Therefore since these three qualities are observed in all the effects of nature, they must be found also in the cause, as there is nothing in the effect which is not also existent in the cause. Nature, accordingly, is the equipoise of goodness, passion and darkness. The argument for the existence of nature is then as follows,—there must be something which is unlimited, because that which is limited cannot be the cause of all things; and such a Principle of Illimitedness exists; for if it did not exist, the ultimate cause of finite things would be nothing; but this is impossible; for an entity can be produced from an entity, but not from a non-entity, because the product of a non-entity would be also a non-entity. Nature then is the ultimate cause; as such it is eternal, infinite, undiscernible and without intelligence.

Is there no other principle as eternal and independent as nature? Nature, according to the Sánkhya, is the exhaustive cause of all effects. If there is another principle, it must, in the first instance, be without effects. Is there such a principle? The Sánkhya answers, there is; it is soul, and the proofs of the existence of the soul are the following.

First; nature is the cause of all finite things as to their substance, but not as to their combination and arrangement.

Nature is without intelligence, and is blind; but in its effects, arrangement and combination are evident; they must therefore be derived from a principle which is intelligent and overrules nature.

Secondly; the arrangement of the various principles for the purpose of producing their respective effects is not to satisfy any other aim of unthinking nature, but to answer the purpose of some other principle.

Thirdly; since light does not appertain to the unintelligent, it must appertain to what is intelligent, which is the soul.

Soul therefore exists independently of nature, and has properties which are in opposition to those of nature. It has not the three qualities of goodness, activity and darkness like nature, it is without qualities; it does not produce for the purpose of satisfying some other principle, as nature does, but it experiences, enjoys what is produced by nature for the soul's sake; it is intelligent, while nature is blind; and lastly it is without action, while nature is the adequate cause of all action.

The creation of the world arises out of the union of the two principles, soul and nature. But is the soul *one* like nature, or if there are many souls, is there one soul, distinguished from all others by the attributes of omnipotence, and omniscience &c.? The Sánkhya, (at least the Pravachana-Sútras), denies this last supposition; there is no supreme soul, no God, and it tries to prove this by the following dilemma:—If there is a God, he must be either free from the world, or he must be bound by it. He cannot be free; for in that case he would have no desire inducing him to create.* He cannot be bound; for then his knowledge would be limited, and he would not be omniscient; in either case therefore the existence of God is impossible.—I postpone replying to this reasoning to the close of my Lecture. As to the first question the Sánkhya says, there are numerous souls, which is inferred from the fact, that the experience of different individuals at one and the same time is different; for while one enjoys happiness, the other suffers pain, and these affections could not arise simultaneously in the same soul.

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* This supposition is wholly gratuitous, and the argument therefore inconclusive.

But, let us ask, how can the world be created by the union of Nature with Souls, Nature being active, but having no influence on the Soul, and Soul being intelligent, but not communicating its intelligence; The Sánkhya says, creation is effected by proximity; nature is enlightened by the proximity of the soul, and by proximity a soul is the witness of nature, as a white crystal appears red by proximity to a red substance.

There are, accordingly, two principles which unite for the creation of the world; the one is Nature, eternal, one, active and all-pervading, the second principle is that of the Soul, eternal, many in number, and intelligent. These two Principles, unlike in all other respects, have this in common that they are eternal.

What are now the effects of nature? Nature, as we have seen before, is the equipoise of the three qualities of Goodness, Activity and Darkness. Their separate existence is not discernible, while in equipoise. The first effect produced from nature, is therefore to annihilate the balance of these qualities, so that one or the other preponderates. In other words, there must be a power, a principle to discern, to distinguish, to manifest. The first effect of Nature is Buddhi, intellect, the great principle, from which all other principles are created. Intellect is accordingly explained to be ascertainment; for the ascertainment, they say, that this is a table, this a candlestick, is effected by intellect.

Intellect again is of eight forms, or has eight faculties. Four of them partake of goodness. They are, virtue, knowledge, calmness and superhuman power. Virtue comprises humanity, liberality, acts of self-restraint and religious observances. Knowledge is either external or internal; external is the knowledge of the Vedas, &c. internal the knowledge by which the soul, nature, intellect and the other principles are comprehended and distinguished according to their properties. Calmness is also twofold, external and internal. The first is the indifference of one who despises the objects of the senses in consequence of observing their defects and the trouble of acquiring and preserving them; the latter is the indifference of one who is desirous of liberation, and looks upon nature as if it were the delusion of witchcraft or a dream. Power is eightfold, minuteness, magnitude, lightness,

reach, gratification of will, dominion, subjugation and irresistible purpose. By the faculty of minuteness, one may traverse the world, by magnitude he may expand himself so as to occupy all space, by lightness, he may ascend to the polar sphere upon a sun-beam, by reach, he can touch the moon with the tip of his finger, by gratification of will, he may acquire any object he desires, by dominion, he governs the three worlds, by subjugation, he keeps all things subject, by irresistible purpose, he influences the situation, rest and motion of all things.

The four remaining forms of intellect are the converse of the former, viz. vice, ignorance, want of calmness and want of power, and as the former functions partook of goodness, so the latter partake of darkness.

Intellect, the effect of nature, is also creative; from it originates Ahamkára, which means Egoity or Self-consciousness. Egoity is the conviction that it is I who perceive, think and act. Egoity is accordingly the power of individualising. By intellect things are indeed distinguished; but they are not separated from each other; there must be a faculty which makes them independent of each other, and at the same time refers them to its self; this is the principle of Egoity, and from its agency the Sánkhya derives the individual existence of things.

Egoity, being an effect of Intellect, is again creative. Its effects are twofold, the objects which are perceived and enjoyed, and the organs by which perception and enjoyment are effected. When goodness in Egoity predominates over darkness and action, the eleven organs, before enumerated, are called into existence; when darkness in Egoity predominates over goodness and action, the subtile elements are called into existence. In both cases, however, in the production of the eleven organs as well as of the five subtile elements, it is necessary, that the principle of activity should assist; for goodness and darkness in themselves are inert, and they only become active, when connected with the principle of action.

From the eleven organs no effect proceeds; the five subtile elements, on the other hand, are also causes; they produce the five gross elements, viz. the elements which are perceived by the

senses; for the subtile elements are not perceived by man; his knowledge of them is derived from inference only. Therewith the sphere of nature's effects terminates. There are, no doubt, a number of effects, different from those which have been mentioned; but these effects contain no new principle; they are only a combination of the former principles, not some thing entirely new; water for instance is some thing different from earth, or from Egoity, while an earthen vessel is only a modification of earth.

According to the Sánkhya, the effect existed, before it was produced by the cause; it existed in the cause.* Production is therefore merely a manifestation. As objects, invisible in the dark, become visible through light, so, they say, effects have a previous existence, but become manifest only through their cause. As production is manifestation, or an emanation of effect from cause, so destruction is disappearance, or the return of effect to its cause. Thus from Nature emanates Intellect, from Intellect Egoity, from Egoity the eleven organs and the five subtile elements, from the five subtile elements the five gross elements; and, vice versâ, there is a regress from the five gross elements into the five subtile elements; they again together with the eleven organs are absorbed by Egoity, this by Intellect, and Intellect reenters Nature, from whence the same process is again to commence. This circle of emanation and re-absorption is eternal; nature oscillates constantly between the two poles of expansion and concentration.

The knowledge of the 25 principles, in the opinion of the Sánkhya, is not only an enlightment of the mind, but it is indispensable, to enable man to attain his highest end. To explain.

* Mádhava, in his Sarva-Darsaṇa-Sangraha, says, that four theories may be formed regarding the idea of causality. Either the effect which is something existing, proceeds from nothing (the view of the Bauddhas), or the effect which is nothing, proceeds from something that exists (the view of the Vaiseshikas), or the effect, which seems to exist, but does not actually exist, proceeds from something that exists (the view of the Vedánta), or lastly the effect which is something that exists, proceeds from something that also exists (the view of the Sánkhya).

From the union of the soul with nature, transmigration originates. By transmigration man is subject to pain, vice and ignorance. The last end of man is no other than to obtain cessation of the sufferings produced by the connexion of the soul with the world. Absolute cessation of pain is not effected by the instructions of the Vedas, say the Sánkhya Philosophers; for the means there recommended are neither pure nor effectual. They are not pure; for how can the shedding of blood be pure? And not effectual; for the bliss of heaven, obtained by sacrifices and ritual observances, lasts only for a time, at the end of which a new body must be taken. Nor is absolute cessation from pain effected by temporal means; the latter may alleviate pain for a time, but the effect, the cessation of pain, will disappear with the cause which is transient. All other means more or less bind the soul to the world; vice, ignorance, passion and feebleness degrade man in the scale of being; virtue, calmness and power may elevate him, but they do not entirely release him from his bondage. There remains, therefore, but one means of effecting his liberation from nature and thereby absolute cessation of pain, viz. the perfect knowledge of the 25 principles, the discrimination between soul and nature. But how is the soul delivered by this knowledge? The Sánkhya tells us, that nature is active for the purpose of enabling the soul to contemplate it and to liberate itself, this last being the ultimate end of the creation; if nature, therefore, is perfectly comprehended, every object is gained. By this answer, however, the difficulty which exists in the idea of liberation is not removed. How is it possible, it may be asked, that by knowledge alone nature desists from binding the soul? There are two principles, nature which binds, and soul which is bound. Why do the fetters disappear with the disappearance of her, who has imposed them? The Sánkhya itself is aware of the defect of the argument, and is compelled to declare, that there are no real fetters, that bondage does not exist for the soul. It is merely a delusion to think, that the soul is bound; on the contrary, it is nature which binds herself, and when the true knowledge arises, that soul is different from nature and that it is ever free, the delusion of its bondage disappears. Then the soul is

for ever liberated from the world, and the highest object of man obtained, as is said in the 63rd Sloka of the Káriká,—"Verily, not soul is bound, nor is released, nor migrates, but nature alone, in relation to various things, is bound, is released, and migrates," and in the 63rd,—"By seven modes nature binds herself, by one she releases herself for the soul's wish.

Herewith I conclude my sketch of the Sánkhya, and it only remains to offer a few remarks on the merits of the system. I have above stated, that in the Hindu systems we cannot trace the exact progress from one to another, the historical data being wanting; we may, however, be able to show a progress as to the general features of those systems, which may be effected in a double manner, first, by comparing them with the Upanishads, the admitted foundations of the Hindu systems. Those which deviate least from the Upanishads, are, generally speaking, the systems prior in time; those which deviate more widely from them, are later. Secondly, the systems which show a further progress in thinking, in which ideas are more developed and method more clearly defined, must be considered as also of late origin.

According to either criterion, the Sánkhya is subsequent to the Vedánta. The Vedánta is nothing more than the systematic exposition of the doctrines of the Upanishads; it is the system which we should expect, in the first instance, to proceed from them. The Sánkhya, on the other hand, differs from the Upanishads in several important points, especially by the assertion of the independence of nature, and of the multitude of souls.

The Sánkhya is also more advanced in thought than the Vedánta in its idea of philosophy and in the method which it follows. The Vedánta assumes to be founded on revelation, and this revelation it finds in the Upanishads. Its doctrines are not founded on reason or on researches into the phenomena of external nature or of mind; for man by the mere force of his own reason cannot discover truth. Reason has only a secondary office; revelation being given, reason may be employed in classifying and arranging and harmonizing the various statements of the Upanishads. Philosophy, therefore, here does not so much

pursue a train of reasoning, derived from its own nature, but merely performs the part of a critic and commentator. We may say, therefore, the Vedánta is not, strictly speaking, philosophy; for it is dependent upon something out of the sphere of philosophy.

The Sánkhya, on the other hand, has attained the idea of philosophy. The function of philosophy in its independence of revelation is sharply defined. It is reason, discrimination by which alone philosophical knowledge is gained; no other means affords an insight into the principles of our nature. By reason they are apprehended, they are distinguished from one another, and are assigned their exact place in the scale of beings. Nevertheless, the Sánkhya does not deny the authority of the Vedas, although it keeps for its own investigations a space independent of all foreign jurisdiction. This is no small praise, especially if we consider, how much this view (that Philosophy is independent of revelation) was opposed to all the intellectual and social opinions of the Hindus.

It has yet a greater merit in its more accurate delineation of the method of philosophy. I have mentioned to you, that philosophy in its metaphysical department has a method of its own. At first sight we do not observe, that the Vedánta follows such a method, but on more thoroughly entering into the subject, we find an indication of the fact in the operation which is called in the Vedánta-Sára "Apavada," Abstraction or Negation, by which the errors of our view of the world will be gradually removed; the necessity, however, of this principle of Negation is not exactly explained, but is left to our own judgment to discover. The Sánkhya in this respect does not only outstrip the Vedánta, but all the other systems of the Hindus. It clearly describes the general outline by which it proposes to define and distinguish all its principles, the reason for which it proceeds from one principle to a higher one, and why soul and nature are the two last principles from which all the others must be derived.

I proceed now to the consideration of these last principles. Philosophy in its first attempts at explaining the phenomena of the world seems by a kind of necessity always to arrive at the

conclusion that the world is identical with its origin, or in other words, is always Pantheistic. Thus we find it in the systems of the Greeks, and at its culminating point in the system of the Eleates who asserted, that, beside abstract existence, there is nothing, and that all is one, identical and indistinguishable existence. The same idea we meet in Hindu philosophy. Brahma, who, according to the Vedánta, is existence, knowledge and bliss, exists alone, and the existence of the world, independent of him, is a delusion. The world is created by ignorance, which these Philosophers describe as existent and non existent, and altogether dependent upon Brahma. This is the point at which the Sánkhya first deviates from the Vedánta. That there is soul, they do not doubt, but how soul can be thought as the only thing existent, they do not understand. If this is so, creation, as different from it, is impossible; creation therefore being admitted, it cannot proceed from the soul alone. If then the Vedántists deny a creation, and creation is attributed to ignorance or delusion, how is it possible, the followers of the Sánkhya say, that such a thing as ignorance exists? If ignorance is not in Brahma, the Vedántists have thereby acknowledged some being, independent of Brahma; and if ignorance is in Brahma, the Vedántists assert the ne-plus-ultra of absurdity in attributing to one and the same being omniscience and ignorance. It is, therefore, necessary to admit, that, besides soul, some thing else exists which is opposed to it, and while soul is intelligent and not creative, that there exists an irrational and creative principle, which is nature.

In the argument of the Sánkhya thus described we observe a decided progress of thought, compared with the views of the Vedánta.

The chief defects of the Sánkhya we find on analysing the two principal notions of the system, nature and soul. Nature is the equipoise of the three qualities, before explained; it is unchangeable, independent of every thing else, and unintelligent. We ask now, in what manner do the three qualities exist in nature? Are there three natures, one goodness, another activity, and the third darkness? No, they say, there is but one. Then, we answer, there ought not to be the three distinctions; for if they are real dis-

tinctions, there is not one, but three, and if they are not real distinctions, they should not be called so. Again, nature, the Sánkhya teaches, is unchangeable, and yet it produces; how is this consistent with its being unchangeable? Why does it not remain in the state of equipoise which is its distinctive characteristic? It undergoes change in order to be contemplated, comprehended and enjoyed by the soul. Yet the Sánkhya says, that nature is independent of the soul, and that the soul has no activity; in this case, nature should not be influenced by the soul; and if nature be, nevertheless, active for the sake of the soul, it should know the soul; but it is against the idea of nature to know. Further, nature is irrational; if so, neither itself nor its products should have any attribute of reason; for what is not in the cause, cannot be in the effect. We find quite the contrary; the first production of blind nature is perceptive intellect. Accordingly, at variance with its principles, the Sánkhya enters the province of the mind; for intellect produces Egoity, and Egoity the organs. What then remains for the soul, if its own empire, the intellectual phenomena, is occupied by a stranger, viz. by nature? Hence one may be easily led to suspect, that all the high words of the Sánkhya regarding the soul are mere mockery, and intended to deceive, that the system is actually a concealed materialism, since all the functions of mind are occupied and performed by matter. However, this is not the case; the Sánkhya admits not only the existence of the soul; it establishes it also by a number of proofs, and to the soul is assigned rule over nature, and it is soul which is the ultimate aim of nature's works.

As their notion of nature is contradictory, so we shall find their notion of the soul also inconsistent. Soul is mere intelligence, independent, and essentially free. What then does it know, it is intelligent of what? Of nature perhaps? But it is independent of nature, and how could it comprehend nature through its own self, this being different from nature? Nor does the soul know its own self, as it cannot divide itself into knowledge and the object of this knowledge. It is, therefore, knowledge of nothing. To know, it must borrow from nature which

produces for it sensations, perceptions and thoughts. Thereby it loses its independence; for it becomes dependent upon nature, and loses of course its freedom; it is bound by nature, although it does not know it. Soul, moreover, is not aware of its own end; this it knows only, when nature through intellect represents to the soul its own image. Nor is freedom gained by the soul itself, but through nature; nature, therefore, determines the end and the means for the soul. To save the notion of the soul from these contradictions, the Sánkhya has at last to admit, that the bondage of the soul is only apparent, and thus it is inconsistent with its commencement, according to which the creation proceeds from the union of soul and nature.

And here we come to the gravest error of the Sánkhya, the denial of God. The creation is not effected by an all-wise, all-powerful and all-bounteous God, but by the constant proximity between soul and nature. This, we say, is contradictory, finite souls being ignorant, without objects of their own, and unable to govern themselves; it is, therefore, impossible, that they should devise laws for the government of Nature. This error, however, does not arise from a sensual or immoral tendency of the Sánkhya. Far from it; the Sánkhya is by no means materialistic, it rather elevates soul above matter; but the denial of God appears to have been the consequence of a strict adherence to the premises. I said, that the atheism of the Sánkhya does not rise from a tendency to materialism, and I may add, that is is also no necessary consequence of the premises; for a later branch of the Sánkhya school expressly declares, that there must be an omniscient cause of creation. I quote here Vachaspati's, words in his explanation of the 56 Sloka of the Káriká,—"But whether this evolution of nature be for its own purpose or that of another, it is a rational principle that acts. Nature cannot act without rationality, and therefore there must be a reason which directs nature. Finite souls, though rational, cannot direct nature, as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an omniscient being, directing nature, which is Ísvara or God."

In conclusion, I would draw your attention to a part of the system which I may call its mysticism. We have seen, how well

the Sánkhya has described the philosophical method, that is to say, how well it understood the nature of intellect. But it attributes to intellect, not only discrimination between the principles, not only elevation to virtue and liberation of the mind from passions, but also superhuman power, so that one can go through rocks, walk on moon-beams &c., which more reminds one of such tales as Fortunatus' wonderful cap, and suggests the idea that the intention was more to impress the vulgar with a feeling of awe than to state the simple results of philosophical enquiry.

The Sánkhya then is, on the whole, one of the most original and bold attempts to comprehend by the sole power of reason, man and nature. It has its defects, but so have all the ancient systems. It is in the nature of human reason to err, and especially in the difficult task of discovering the principles of its own nature. One system corrects the other, by which progress to higher and more consistent principles is rendered possible; but we must admit, that all our science is at best a small fragment of a circle of knowledge whose radius is infinite.

My intention in giving you a sketch of the Sánkhya system was not so much to renew in you a desire for abstract studies and for reviving the systems of old, but to give you an idea of the acuteness and the methodical research of which the Hindus were capable some thousand years ago, how among them rose thinkers of high power, who as such at least may be ranked with the great philosophers of Greece. No doubt, a nation from which sprung such eminent men, will do credit by their future discoveries in science and performances in art to the education now offered to them, and the day, I trust, is not far distant when the Hindus, as familiar with European science as any scholar in Europe, will have their share in promoting human civilisation.